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Foreword
Fraud is a challenging problem. Its economic effects are clear – worse 
public services, less financially stable and profitable companies, 
diminished levels of disposable income for all of us, charities deprived 
of resources needed for charitable purposes. In every sector of every 
country, fraud has a pernicious impact on the quality of life. 
However, historically, fraud has been described as ‘difficult to cost’1 and 
until relatively recently, it has not been possible to quantify these effects. 
However, the last 10-15 years have seen this situation change. 
This Report builds on research first undertaken and published in 2009, 
2011 and 2013 considering just what the financial cost of fraud really 
is. It represents another output of the fruitful collaboration between PKF 
Littlejohn, the leading accountants, and the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies at the University of Portsmouth (CCFS), Europe’s leading fraud 
research centre.
Rapid changes have taken place in countering fraud over the last 15 
years. It used to be thought that the only thing to be done was to hope 
that it wouldn’t happen and then to react when it did (after losses had 
been incurred) with an investigation followed sometimes by litigation or a 
prosecution.
Litigation or a prosecution can still be important but in 2015, only taking 
a reactive approach seems rather old fashioned.
In the UK, from the late 1990s, the Department of Work and Pensions 
and the NHS started to accurately measure fraud (and error) losses. 
In 2006, the Government’s ‘Fraud Review’ Report said, ‘better 
measurement is crucial to a properly designed and effective strategic 
response to fraud and to supporting better management of fraud risks’.  
The National Audit Office’s 2008 ‘Guide to Tackling External Fraud’ 
said, ‘Assessing the scale of loss from fraud is an important first step 
in developing a strategy for tackling external fraud’. The Government’s 
National Fraud Authority produced an Annual Fraud Indicator each year 
up to 2013. In 2014, the Cabinet Office Fraud, Error and Debt Taskforce, 
at the behest of Ministers, asked every Government Department to 
undertake loss measurement exercises.  
In Europe, the European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Declaration 
of 2004, agreed by organisations from 28 countries, called for ‘the 
development of a European common standard of risk measurement, 
with annual statistically valid follow up exercises to measure progress in 
reducing losses to fraud and corruption throughout the EU’.
In the United States, the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 
provided that public agencies should publish a ‘statistically valid estimate’ 
of the extent of fraud and error in their programs and activities, and this 
was reinforced by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act 
of 2010. As a result most major U.S. public sector agencies have been 
measuring and reporting losses for more than a decade.
As a result, many more exercises to measure losses have taken place 
than would otherwise be the case, and this Report documents what has 
been found over the period from 1997 to 2013. It also compares the 
cost of fraud in 2012 and 2013 with 2010 and 2011.
Of course, there are still some estimates published which are not reliable 
for the purpose of estimating the total cost of fraud. Counting only those 
losses which are detected or prosecuted, or surveying those working in 
the area for their opinion, will never be accepted as a reliable indicator of 
the real economic cost of fraud. 
This Report takes the debate much further forward.
It shows that the financial cost of fraud and error can be accurately 
measured in the same way as other business costs; it shows that this is 
not unnecessarily costly or difficult; and most importantly, it shows what 
the financial cost is likely to be. 
The volume of data, the total value of the expenditure concerned, the 
number of different types of expenditure and the different organisations 
and countries concerned are impressive. 
It will take a brave Chief Executive or Director of Finance of any 
organisation to argue that the impact of fraud on their organisation is less 
than what this Report finds to be the case – more than two thirds of the 
exercises we reviewed showed fraud related losses of more than 3% 
of expenditure, with the 17 year average running at 5.6% and average 
losses rising in the last two years by almost 18%.
The evidence revealed in this Report that these losses can be, and 
have been, reduced by up to 40% within 12 months, provides a real 
opportunity in difficult economic circumstances. Private companies 
can gain a competitive advantage if the cost of fraud is reduced; public 
expenditure reductions can be less painful; and the charity sector can 
increase the resources it has available to deliver on important charitable 
purposes.
Fraud is the last great unreduced business cost, and this Report shows 
just how significant that cost is.
JIM GEE 
Partner, Head of Forensic and Counter Fraud Services for PKF Littlejohn 
and Visiting Professor and Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies 
at the University of Portsmouth
1 ‘Counting the costs of crime in Australia: a 2005 update’ – The Australian Institute of Criminology
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1 // 
introduction
1.1. This Report renews research first undertaken in 2009, and 
then in 2011 and 2013, collating accurate, statistically valid 
information from around the world about the real financial 
cost of fraud and error. Once the extent of fraud losses is 
known then they can be treated like any other business 
cost – as something to be managed and minimised in 
the best interest of the financial health and stability of the 
organisation concerned. It becomes possible to go beyond 
reacting to unforeseen individual instances of fraud and to 
embed strategies to pre-empt and minimise fraud losses in 
business plans.
1.2. The Report doesn’t look at detected fraud or the individual 
cases which have come to light and been prosecuted. 
Because there is no crime which has a 100% detection 
rate, adding together detected fraud significantly 
underestimates the problem. If detected fraud losses go up, 
does that mean that there is more fraud or that there has 
been better detection. Equally, if detected fraud losses fall, 
does that mean that there is less fraud or worse detection?
1.3. The Report also doesn’t rely on survey-based information 
where those involved are asked for their opinions about the 
level of fraud. These tend to vary significantly according to 
the perceived seriousness of the problem at the time by 
those surveyed. Whilst such surveys sometimes represent 
a valid survey of opinion, that is very different from a valid 
survey of losses.
1.4. Instead, this Report considers and analyses 382 exercises 
which have been undertaken around the world during the 
last 17 years, to accurately measure the financial cost 
resulting from fraud and error. 
1.5. This is surely the worst aspect of the problem. Yes, fraud 
is unethical, immoral and unlawful; yes, the individuals who 
are proven to have been involved should be punished; yes, 
the sums lost to fraud need to be traced and recovered. 
However, these are actions which take place after the 
fraud losses have happened – after the resources have 
been diverted from where they were intended and after the 
economic damage has occurred. 
1.6. In almost every other area of business life, organisations 
know what their costs are – staffing costs, accommodation 
costs, utility costs, procurement costs and many others. 
For centuries, these costs have been assessed and 
reviewed and measures have been developed to pre-empt 
them and improve efficiency. This incremental process now 
often delivers quite small additional improvements.
1.7. Fraud and error costs, on the other hand, have only had 
the same focus over the last 15 years or so. The common 
position has been that organisations have either denied 
that they had any fraud or planned only to react after fraud 
has taken place. Because of this, fraud is now one of the 
great unreduced business costs.
1.8. However, a cost can only be managed and reduced if it can 
be measured, and a methodology to do this accurately has 
only been developed and implemented over the last decade.
1.9. Now that we can measure fraud and error losses, we can 
make proper judgements about the level of investment to 
be made in reducing them. We can measure these losses 
and we can measure the financial benefits resulting from 
their reduction.
1.10. In the current macro-economic climate, reducing these 
losses is one of the least painful ways of reducing business 
costs. Fraud is an ‘unnecessary’ cost because much 
of it can be pre-empted. This Report identifies what the 
financial cost of fraud and error has been found to be and 
thus, the ‘size of the prize’ to be achieved from reducing 
that cost.
1.11. Of course, there is always more research to be done 
and any organisation should consider what its own fraud 
and error costs are likely to be; however, the volume of 
data which is already available from exercises covering 
total expenditure of over £9.76 trillion, sterling equivalent, 
points clearly to losses usually being found in the range of 
3-10%, probably around the average of 5.6% and possibly 
much higher.
1.12. We will continue to monitor data as it becomes available 
and publish further Reports as appropriate.
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2 // 
overview
2.1. Our research has now reviewed 382 loss measurement 
exercises undertaken over the period from 1997 to 
2013. The exercises took place across 40 different types 
of expenditure in 46 organisations from 9 countries 
considering losses in expenditure with a total value of 
£9.76 trillion. The value of the expenditure examined has 
not been uprated to 2013 values. The losses referred to are 
a percentage loss of expenditure.
2.2. This Report is based on extensive global research, building 
on previously established direct knowledge, to collate 
information about relevant exercises. The data was then 
analysed electronically. Exercises were collated from 
Europe, North America and Australasia. None were found 
in Asia or Africa up to 2013, although the researchers are 
now aware that such exercises have taken place. Relevant 
data will be included in our next Report.
2.3. The Report has excluded guesstimates, figures derived 
from detected fraud losses, and figures resulting from 
surveys of opinion. It has also excluded some loss 
measurement exercises where it is clear that they have not 
met the standards described below.
2.4. It has included exercises which
•	 have considered a statistically valid sample of income or 
expenditure
•	 have sought and examined information indicating the 
presence of fraud, error or correctness in each case 
within that sample
•	 have been completed and reported
•	 have been externally validated
•	 have a measurable level of statistical confidence
•	 have a measurable level of accuracy.
2.5. There are a number of caveats.
2.6. Some of the exercises have resulted in estimates of 
the fraud frequency rate, some of the percentage of 
expenditure lost to fraud, and some have measured both.
2.7. It is also the case that some exercises have separately 
identified and measured fraud and error, and some have 
not. 
2.8. Sometimes, once such exercises have been completed, 
the organisations concerned have, mistakenly in the view 
of the authors of this Report, decided not to publish their 
results. Transparency about the scale of the problem 
is a key factor in its solution, because attention can be 
focussed and a proportionate investment made to address 
the issue.
2.9. In some cases, those directly involved in countering fraud 
have decided, confidentially, to provide information about 
unpublished exercises for wider consideration. In those 
cases, while the overall figures have been included in the 
findings of this Report, no specific reference has been 
made to the organisations concerned.
2.10. The authors of this Report are also aware of a very small 
number of other exercises which have been completed, 
but which have not been published and where nothing is 
known of the findings. 
2.11. Finally, it is important to emphasise that this research will 
never be complete. More evidence becomes available each 
year. However, the preponderance of the evidence does 
point clearly in one direction, as is explained later.
2.12. While it is necessary to make these caveats clear, the 
importance of the evidence collated in this Report should 
not be underestimated. It shows that losses to fraud and 
error represent a significant, damaging and, crucially, 
unnecessary business cost.
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3.1. The nine countries in which the authors are aware that 
fraud loss analysis exercises have taken place are:
•	 the United Kingdom
•	 the United States of America
•	 France
•	 Belgium
•	 The Netherlands
•	 Ireland
•	 Canada
•	 Australia
•	 New Zealand.
3.2. By value of income or expenditure measured, the United 
States has undertaken the greatest amount of work in this 
area. This is a direct reflection of the Improper Payments 
Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) which requires designated 
major U.S. public authorities to estimate the annual amount 
of payments made where fraud and error are present, and 
to report the estimates to the President and Congress with 
a progress report on actions to reduce them. The Improper 
Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 further 
strengthened this requirement.
3.3. The guidance relating to the original IPIA stated ‘The 
estimates shall be based on the equivalent of a statistical 
random sample with a precision requiring a sample of 
sufficient size to yield an estimate with a 90% confidence 
interval of plus or minus 2.5%’2. This remains the case 
although many U.S. agencies undertake work to the 
higher standard often found in the UK and Europe – 95% 
statistical confidence and +/- 1%.
3.4. In other countries, while there has not hitherto been any 
legal requirement, there is a growing understanding that the 
key to successful loss reduction is to understand the nature 
and scale of the problem. For example, in Europe, the 
European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Declaration, 
agreed by organisations from 28 countries called for ’the 
development of a European common standard of risk 
measurement, with annual statistically valid follow up 
exercises to measure progress in reducing losses to fraud 
and corruption throughout the EU.’3
3.5. In the UK, the Government is on record as requiring 
this work to be undertaken. Indeed in late 2014, the 
Government’s Cabinet Office Fraud Error and Debt 
Taskforce, with the agreement of Ministers, asked all 
Government Departments to undertake ‘random sampling’ 
loss measurement exercises. 
3.6. This is a major step forward to countering fraud in UK 
central government. The results of this work should be 
available in 2015 and our next Report will, hopefully, 
include this data. 
3.7. These developments are part of a consistent trend. Over 
the period considered by this Report – 1997 to 2013 – the 
growth in the number of fraud loss measurement (FLM) 
exercises is marked, with a projected nine fold increase in 
prevalence.
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3 // 
data from around the world
2. Appendix C to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123
3. European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Declaration 2004
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4.1. The types of income and expenditure where losses have 
been measured include:
•	 payroll
•	 procurement
•	 housing
•	 education
•	 social security
•	 healthcare
•	 insurance
•	 tax credits
•	 pensions
•	 agriculture
•	 construction
•	 compensation
4.2. The key figures which have been produced concern 
the percentage loss rate (PLR - i.e. the proportion of 
expenditure lost to fraud and error).
4.3. There is more research still to be done and it is intended 
that this Report will be updated on a regular basis.
4 // 
Types of income and expenditure 
and the nature of the figures

© PKF LittLeJohn LLP and University oF PortsMoUth 2015PaGe 9
ForensiC 
& CoUnTer FraUd
serviCes
5.1. The range of percentage losses across all the exercises 
reviewed between 1997 and 2013 was found to be between 
0.02 and 22.1%, with average losses of 5.6% (69% of the 
exercises showed loss figures of more than 3%). 
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5.2. Just considering those exercises undertaken between 
2010 and 2013 shows average losses increasing from 
5.01% in 2010 and 2011 to 5.9% in 2012 and 2013 – an 
increase of 17.8%. in 2010 and 2011 to 5.9% in 2012 and 
2013 – an increase of 17.8%.
5 // 
Fraud and error losses
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5.3. Over the whole period of the research the cost of fraud 
for the last two years reviewed (2012 and 2013) is 5.9%. 
This is 29% higher than for the period prior to the recent 
recession from 1997 to 2007.
5.4. The reasons for these increases – whether over the last 
two years or over the longer period since 2007 - seem 
to go beyond the economic cycle. Previous research has 
shown an apparent trend where fraud increases during 
recessions and plateaus or decreases slightly during 
periods of economic growth.
5.5. This does not seem to explain why the cost of fraud has 
risen in 2012-2013. Further research will be needed but it 
may be that longer term social and technological factors 
are an underlying cause of the growth of fraud, in addition 
to the effect of the economic cycle. 
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5.6. Such factors might include:
•	 greater individualisation (less adherence to collective 
moral and ethical ‘norms’)
•	 greater complexity of processes and systems (it 
becoming easier to disguise fraud amidst this complexity)
•	 more transactions by computer / less face to face 
transactions (fraudsters feeling more distant from the 
victims of their dishonesty and thus less concerned 
about any response)
•	 the differences between pre and post-recession 
economies 
•	 more people under financial pressure during the financial 
crisis 
•	 the increasing pace of change in business (with controls 
struggling to keep up).
5.7. Where organisations have undertaken repeated exercises 
to measure their losses in the same areas of expenditure, 
then the evidence also shows that this has helped to 
reduce them. 
5.8. The global average loss rate for the entire period of the 
research (5.6%), when taken as a proportion of the global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2013 ($75.59 trillion 
or £49.68 trillion)4, equates to £2.78 trillion ($4.23 trillion), 
a sum more than 50% greater than the UK’s entire GDP. 
Even reducing such losses by 40%, which individual 
organisations have achieved, would free up more than  
£1.1 trillion – a sum greater than the GDP of 175 countries.
5.9. In the UK, applying that global average loss rate to 
GDP5 would imply total losses of £98.6 billion each year. 
Reducing such losses by 40% would free up more than 
£39 billion each year. This sum is equivalent to more than 
the UK Government spent on education in 2013 and only 
slightly less than it spent on military defence.
5.10. On the basis of the evidence, it is clear that fraud and error 
losses in any organisation should currently be expected 
to be at least 3%, probably almost 6% and possibly more 
than 10%. It would be wrong to go too much further 
in terms of predicting where in this range losses for an 
individual organisation will be, without some organisation-
specific information about the strength of arrangements to 
protect it against fraud (its ‘fraud resilience’).
5.11. PKF Littlejohn and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies 
(CCFS), in parallel research, have developed Europe’s 
most comprehensive database of fraud resilience 
information, with data recorded concerning more than 
700 organisations from almost every economic sector. 
By combining the data which underpins this Report and 
organisation-specific information about fraud resilience,  
we are able to predict: 
•	 the likely scale of losses
•	 the key improvements which would reduce them, and 
•	 the related cost.
5.12. We can also accurately measure losses or train client 
organisations to do this if engaged to do so. The practical 
experience of PKF Littlejohn specialists, combined with 
the academic rigour of CCFS researchers, provides an 
unparalleled expert resource.
4 World Bank figures
5 World Bank figures indicate UK GDP for 2013 was $2.678 trillion or £1.76 trillion
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6 // 
Conclusion and recommendations
6.1 This is the fourth Report in an area where, for too long, the 
accurate measurement of losses was considered either 
impossible or too difficult. It no longer is. In many areas 
loss measurement has become routine. Losses to fraud 
and error can now be treated as a business cost like any 
other – to be measured, managed and minimised.
6.2. It is also the case that work to measure losses can be 
highly cost-effective. The extent to which efforts to reduce 
losses are helped by greater knowledge about the problem 
is shown by the significantly lower average level of losses 
where they have been re-measured over a period of time, 
in the same area of expenditure.
6.3. Where losses have been measured, and the organisations 
concerned have accurate information about their nature 
and extent, there are examples, especially in the UK and 
U.S., where losses have been substantially reduced. The 
best examples over the 17 year period covered by this 
Report include:
•	 the UK’s National Health Service (the second largest 
organisation in the world) between 1999 and 2006 where 
losses were reduced by up to 60%, and by up to 40% 
over a shorter period6
•	 the U.S. Department of Education, which reduced 
its losses across a $12 billion grant program by 35% 
between 2001 and 20057
•	 the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which reduced its 
losses across a $12 billion program by 28% between 
2002 and 20048
•	 the UK’s Department of Work and Pensions which 
successfully reduced its losses in Income Support and 
Job Seekers Allowance by 50% between 1997/98 and 
2005/069
•	 the U.S. Department for Veterans Affairs which 
successfully reduced its losses across a $4 billion 
program by more than 46% in 2010 and 201110
•	 the U.S. Department of Agriculture (again) successfully 
reduced its losses across an $8 billion program by more 
than 22%11
•	 the UK’s Department of Work and Pensions (again) 
achieved a significant reduction of more than 24% in 
losses in respect of Job Seekers Allowance12.
6.4. Even during the two years after the start of the recession in 
2008, when losses generally were increasing rapidly, two 
of the organisations included in our research reported very 
significant reductions in their losses – one by 33% and the 
other by 19% - within a single year in each case.
6.5. Three things are clear:
•	 Losses to fraud and error can be measured – and cost 
effectively
•	 On the basis of the evidence it is likely that losses in any 
organisation and any area of expenditure will be at least 
3%, probably near to 6% and possibly more than 10%, 
and
•	 With the benefit of accurate information about their 
nature and extent, they can be reduced significantly.
6.6. In the current economic climate, not to consider 
the financial benefits of making relatively painless 
reductions in losses to fraud and error seems 
foolhardy.
6 UK NHS Counter Fraud and Security Management Service – 1999 – 2006  
 Performance Statistics 
7 U.S. Department of Education Performance and Accountability Reports 2001 – 2005
8 U.S. Department of Agriculture Performance and Accountability Reports 2002 - 2004
9 UK Department of Work and Pensions - Fraud and Error in the Benefit System April 2005   
 to March 2006 
10 Department for Veterans Affairs – Performance and Accountability Report 2012
11 Department of Agriculture – Performance and Accountability Report 2011
12 Department of Work and Pensions – Fraud and Error in the Benefit System – 2011/2012   
 Estimates (Revised Edition)
Fraud is a challenging problem. Its economic effects are clear 
– worse public services, less financially stable and profitable 
companies and diminished levels of disposable income for all of us 
except the fraudsters. 
However, fraud has historically been described as ‘difficult to cost’ 
and, until relatively recently, it has not been possible to quantify 
these effects. Over the last decade the situation has changed. 
The most recent global study, undertaken by Jim Gee, PKF 
Littlejohn’s Head of Forensic and Counter Fraud Services, with the 
University of Portsmouth, reported the latest accurate and statistically 
valid information from around the world about the real financial cost 
of fraud and error. It reviewed 290 exercises to accurately measure 
fraud and error losses, covering 40 different types of expenditure 
over 15 years and with a total expenditure valued at over £7.2 trillion 
sterling equivalent. It found, across this massively representative 
sample, average losses were 5.47% of expenditure. 
Financial benefits of 2% of expenditure within 
12 months 
Once the extent of fraud losses is known, then they can be treated 
like any other business cost – something to be reduced and 
minimised in the best interest of the financial health and stability of the 
organisation concerned. PKF Littlejohn offers a service to do just that 
– to measure and to recommend how to reduce such losses, with 
reductions of up to 40% within 12 months possible and up to a 12:1 
return on the cost of the work. lt becomes possible to go beyond 
reacting to unforeseen individual instances of fraud and to include 
plans to pre-empt and minimise fraud losses in business plans. 
In almost every other area of business life, organisations know 
what their costs are – staffing costs, accommodation costs, utility 
costs, procurement costs and many others. Fraud and error costs, 
on the other hand, have only rarely had the same focus. Because 
of this, fraud is now one of the great unreduced business costs. 
We can provide the answers 
Now that we can measure fraud and error losses, we can make 
proper judgements about the level of investment to be made in 
reducing them. Because we can measure these losses, we can 
then measure the financial benefits resulting from their reduction. 
In the current tough business climate, reducing these losses is one 
of the least painful ways of reducing business costs. We can help 
client organisations to do that as well as providing specialist training 
for staff to allow ongoing in-house measurement of the problem.
Find out more 
The cost of PKF Littlejohn’s fraud loss measurement service varies. 
We provide a comprehensive report indicating the level of cost of 
fraud (and error) in your organisation, so that you can make an 
informed judgement on how much to invest to reduce this cost. 
We can complete this work within as little as three months.
What is the financial cost of fraud  
to your organisation?
PKF Littlejohn LLP
To find out more please call +44 (0)20 7516 2288 or email jgee@pkf-littlejohn.com
PKF Littlejohn LLP, Chartered Accountants. A list of members’ names is available at the above address. PKF Littlejohn LLP is 
a limited liability partnership registered in England and Wales No. 0C342572. Registered office as above. PKF Littlejohn LLP 
is a member firm of the PKF International Limited network of legally independent firms and does not accept any responsibility 
or liability for the actions or inactions on the part of any other individual member firm or firms.
PKF Littlejohn LLP, 1 Westferry Circus, Canary Wharf, London E14 4HD     
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Institute. Before joining the University of Portsmouth he was a Research 
Assistant to the Rt. Hon. Bruce George MP specialising in policing, 
security and home affairs issues. Mark completed his undergraduate 
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In the current economic 
climate, not to consider 
the financial benefits of 
making relatively painless 
reductions in losses to 
fraud and error seems 
foolhardy.
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